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The AIG Bailout: Constraining the Fed's Discretion
I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Reserve System (the Fed) was established in
1913, emerging from the ashes of the banking panic of 1907.'
Though the Fed's powers were relatively weak at its inception,'
periods of economic crisis have resulted in an expansion of power
through legislative reform leading to the strong central bank we
know today.3  The bailout of insurance giant American
International Group (AIG) provides a recent example of the Fed's
ability to flex the regulatory muscle developed over the past
4ninety-six years.
This Note will analyze the development of the Fed's power
during the recent financial crisis, with a particular focus on its
decision to bailout AIG using its emergency powers and the
implications of these actions. Though the powers the Fed relied
upon are statutorily permissible and desirable in many cases, the
lack of accountability and transparency in exercising those powers
due to their discretionary nature is troubling Part II will give a
brief history of the controversial development of the central bank.6
Part III will detail the Fed's structure and the emergency powers
used to implement the AIG bailout.' Part IV will analyze some of
the reasons the financial industry, and AIG in particular, suffered
such a devastating collapse and the actions taken by the Fed to
mitigate the damage.8  Part V will describe the potential
1. Steven R. Blau, The Federal Reserve and European Central Bank as Lenders-
of-Last Resort: Different Needles in Their Compasses, 21 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 39, 46
(2008).
2. See David Fettig, Lender of More Than Last Resort, 2002 REGION 15, 15-16,
available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/region/02-12/lender.pdf; Thomas 0.
Porter, II, Comment, The Federal Reserve's Catch-22: A Legal Analysis of the Federal
Reserve's Emergency Powers, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 483,484-85 (2009).
3. See Blau, supra note 1, at 46-48; Porter, supra note 2, at 485.
4. See infra pp. 337-47.
5. See infra pp. 347-58.
6. See infra Part II, pp. 336-37.
7. See infra Part III, pp. 337-41.
8. See infra Part IV, pp. 341-47.
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consequences of the actions taken by the Fed.9 Finally, Part VI
will analyze the implications of having a strong central bank that is
able to act quickly and discretely, but with little oversight or
transparency and discuss recent proposals to modify the Fed's
10
power.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CENTRAL BANK
The idea of a central bank, though now largely accepted,
was extremely controversial during its early stages of
development.1 This controversy is best demonstrated by the
battle between Thomas Jefferson, who strongly opposed the idea
of a central bank, fearing "concentrated economic power[,]" and
Alexander Hamilton, who strongly supported a central bank
modeled after the Bank of England to facilitate efficient
commerce. 12  Hamilton initially won the battle with the
establishment of the first Bank of the United States (BUS) in
1792."3 Though the central bank's twenty-year charter was not
renewed during Jefferson's term as President,14  Congress
chartered the second BUS in 1816,"5 which functioned as a
clearinghouse and exercised limited regulatory powers over the
banking industry. 6 The second BUS met its demise in 1836 during
the Jackson administration because he feared that a private
banking institution was subject to corruption and could not be
controlled. 7
9. See infra Part V, pp. 347-50.
10. See infra Part VI, pp. 350-58.
11. See generally, John Steele Gordon, A Short Banking History of the United
States, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2008, at A17, available at http://online.wsj.com
/article/SB122360636585322023.html (describing the early history and establishment
of central banking in the United States).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See id.; The Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, A History of Central
Banking in the United States, http://www.minneapolisfed.org/community-education/
student/centralbankhistory/bank.cfm [hereinafter History of Central Banking] (Last
visited Feb. 6, 2010).
15. Gordon, supra note 11.
16. History of Central Banking, supra note 14.
17. Id.
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The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 created the Fed in
response to the banking panic of 1907, when an individual person,
J.P. Morgan, served as a lender of last resort.18 Congress created
the Fed in an effort to develop an organization to regulate the
economy and act as a lender of last resort to faltering banks.19
Though its goals have remained constant, the Fed has experienced• • 20
a number of reforms since its inception.
III. THE STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE
A. Basic Structure of the Federal Reserve
Congress designed the Fed "to give it a broad perspective
on the economy and on economic activity in all parts of the
nation., 2' To inform the exercise of this authority, the Fed has
four primary goals that have remained substantially the same: (1)
conducting monetary policy to maintain desirable employment
levels and to prevent inflation; (2) supervising and regulating
banking institutions; (3) ensuring financial market stability posed
by systematic risk; and (4) providing depository institutions and
the US government with financial services.
The Board of Governors enjoys broad powers to supervise
member banks, fashion monetary policy, implement consumer
protection regulations, and oversee bank holding companies and
their non-banking subsidiaries.23 It is required to make an annual
report to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, 24but
18. See MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1867-1960, at 156-168 (Princeton Univ. Press 1993)
(1971).
19. Murray N. Rothbard, The Origins of the Federal Reserve, Q. J. AUSTRIAN
ECON., Fall 1999, at 39 (1999).
20. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE FEDERAL RESERVE
SYSTEM: PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 1-2 (9th ed. 2005), available at http://www.federal
reserve.gov/pf/pdf/pLcomplete.pdf [hereinafter PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS] (listing
major legislative changes that occurred in 1935, 1946, 1956, 1970, 1977, 1978, 1980,
1989, 1991, and 1999).
21. Id. at 3.
22. See id. at 1.
23. 12 U.S.C. § 248 (2006); see also PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS, supra note 20, at 4
(summarizing these regulatory powers).
24. 12 U.S.C. § 247 (2006); see also 12 U.S.C. § 250 (2006) (limiting the executive
branch's power to compel testimony).
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otherwise the Fed enjoys relative independence because its actions
do not have to be ratified by the President.'
The Board of Governors and the twelve Regional Federal
Reserve Banks share responsibility for regulating and supervising
the banking industry." The Regional Reserve Banks are
responsible for "operating a nationwide payments system,[r]
distributing the nation's currency and coin, supervising and
regulating member banks and bank holding companies,[28] and
serving as banker for the U.S. Treasury., 29 Each Reserve Bank is
subject to supervision by the Board of Governors and must submit
its budget for an annual independent audit. ° The Reserve Banks
conduct the day-to-day operations of the Federal Reserve System
and the functions of a central bank.31
B. Tools of the Federal Reserve
The Fed has four primary tools to conduct monetary policy
and stabilize the financial industry. These tools include open
market operations,32 adjusting the reserve requirement,3  requiring
contractual clearing balances, 34 and use of the discount window 35 to
facilitate direct lending by the Fed to other institutions.36  These
tools are utilized primarily to adjust the federal funds rate, the
25. PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS, supra note 20, at 2-3.
26. Id. at 3.
27. The US government charged the Fed with the operation of a payment system,
which facilitates quick and efficient check clearing through the implementation of a
nationwide check-clearing system. PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS, supra note 20, at 6, 83.
28. Generally speaking, a bank holding company is any company that directly or
indirectly controls one or more banks. See 12 U.S.C. § 184 1(a) (2006).
29. PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS, supra note 20, at 6.
30, 12 U.S.C. § 248(a); PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS, supra note 20, at 10-11.
31. See PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS, supra note 20, at 10-11.
32. Open market operations allow the Fed to control the federal funds rate
through the purchase and sale of U.S. Treasury securities. See id. at 37-38.
33. The reserve requirement is the percentage of deposits a bank must hold
against its liabilities or maintain as a non-interest bearing account at their regional
reserve bank. The Fed uses this control to increase or decrease demand for federal
funds. Id. at 41-42.
34. Contractual clearing balances are funds that banks agree to hold in excess of
the reserve requirement in order to protect against unexpected debits in relation to
check clearing. Id. at 31.
35. Id. at 3.
36. Id. at 45.
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interest rate at which member banks loan excess funds on deposit
at their Reserve Bank accounts to each other, by influencing the
supply and demand of available funds.37 Traditionally, open
market operations, conducted by the Federal Open Market
Committee, have been the primary tool used by the Fed in order
to conduct monetary policy. 38  The most important tool used
during the recent financial crisis, however, was lending through the
discount window which hit a record high during the crisis."
C. The Discount Window
The Fed identifies multiple purposes for the discount
window. First, the discount window can be used to control the
federal funds rate less drastically than with open market• 40
operations. On a daily basis, the Fed controls the supply of funds
through the discount window, thus influencing the federal funds
rate.41 Second, the discount window can provide liquidity for
institutions that fall short of their required reserves.42 This is
especially important in times of economic or political crisis, when a
depository institution is struggling and needs increased liquidity in
order to avoid collapse.43  During the recent financial crisis,
discount window lending reached unprecedented levels as
institutions needed increased liquidity.44 Even non-depository
institutions such as Bear Sterns and AIG made use of the discount
window, though they are not depository institutions to which the
Fed would ordinarily have the power to extend discount loans.
37. PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS, supra note 20, at 2-3.
38. Blau, supra note 1, at 47.
39. See Meena Thiruvengadam, Investment Bank Borrowing at Discount Window
Hits Record, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12223780
6611776365.html (discussing the use of the discount window during the crisis); cf
Porter, supra note 2, at 507 (discussing discount window operations during the last
century).
40. See PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS, supra note 20, at 45.
41. See id.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 45-46 (mentioning operating problems, natural disaster, and a
terrorist attack).
44. Thiruvengadam, supra note 39.
45. See 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006); Thiruvengadam, supra note 39.
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The Regional Reserve Banks may extend loans to
depository institutions through the discount window.46 They can
do this in two different ways. First, they can "discount" assets
presented to the bank for up to ninety days. 47 This practice allows
the Fed to lend funds based on the present value of a financial
instrument less the discount rate and then return it to the financial
intitution at maturity for the full value of the instrument.48 Second,
the Fed can make an advance secured by a "pledge of bonds,
notes, certificates of indebtedness, or Treasury bills of the United
States," as well as multiple other approved assets for up to fifteen
days.49 This allows the Fed to extend a loan with an interest rate
equal to the discount rate using approved assets as collateral. °
The primary method used to make loans in recent history has been
the use of advances,5' perhaps due to the Fed's ability to extend
discount loans without being required to acquire financial
instruments except in the case of default. 2
D. The Emergency Powers
Though the Fed can ordinarily only extend discount loans
to depository institutions, it can, in limited circumstances, make
loans to nondepository institutions. 3 This power is extended "in
unusual and exigent circumstances," and allows a Federal Reserve
Bank to make a loan to "any individual, partnership, or
corporation" as long as it is collateralized to the satisfaction of the
Regional Reserve Bank 4  The structure of this provision
inherently grants broad power to the Fed to define "unusual and
46. 12 U.S.C. § 343; 12 U.S.C. § 347 (2006).
47. See Blau, supra note 1, at 51; 12 U.S.C. § 343.
48. See Blau, supra note 1, at 51 n.84.
49. 12 U.S.C. § 347.
50. Blau, supra note 1, at 51 n.84.
51. Id. at 52.
52. See 12 U.S.C. § 347 (stating that the Fed may make advances based on a
"pledge" of acceptable collateral).
53. 12 U.S.C. § 343.
54. Id.
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exigent circumstances," which firms will and will not get loans, and
what can serve as collateral.5
The emergency powers, though extensive, are not
unlimited. The Federal Reserve Board must determine that
"unusual and exigent circumstances exist," that the individual or
institution is "unable to secure adequate credit accommodations
from other sources," and that "action on the matter is necessary to
prevent, correct, or mitigate serious harm to the economy or the
stability of the financial system of the United States. 56 Because
these powers involve significant federal intervention into the
economy, until 2008, they had not been exercised for nearly eighty
57years.
IV. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
A. Causes of the Financial Crisis58
The severity of the global financial meltdown necessitated
the exercise of the Fed's emergency powers.59 Accordingly, it is
important to have a basic understanding of the financial crisis and
55. Before the crisis the Fed had required investment-grade debt; however, since
then it has allowed securities to serve as collateral. See John Goff, Fed Ascending a
Staircase, FIN. WK., Jan. 26, 2009, http://www.financialweek.com/article/20090126/
REG/901269976/1049/Compliance.
56. 12 U.S.C. § 248(r)(2)(A)(ii) (2006); see also 12 U.S.C. § 343 (describing Fed
power during "unusual and exigent circumstances.").
57. Blau, supra note 1, at 53-54.
58. This part offers a very basic analysis of the financial crisis. Other articles
have offered much more detailed analyses that may be informative. See generally
John C. Coffee, Jr., & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have
a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707 (2009) (offering a detailed analysis of the financial
crisis); Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street
Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039 (2007) (offering a detailed
analysis of the financial crisis); Joseph R. Mason & Joshua Rosner, Where Did the
Risk Go? How Misapplied Bond Ratings Cause Mortgage Backed Securities and
Collateralized Debt Obligation Market Disruptions 1-85 (Hudson Inst., Working
Paper, 2007) (offering a detailed analysis of the financial crisis), available at
http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/Hudson-Mortgage-Paper5 3_07.pdf
(offering a detailed analysis of the financial crisis).
59. Cf. Michael J. de la Merced & Eric Dash, Fed Seems Close to Helping A.LG.,
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Sept. 16, 2008, 12:31 PM), http://dealbook.blogs.ny
times.com/2008/09/16/industry-efforts-to-rescue-of-aig-said-to-falter/ (stating the
severe impact AIG's collapse would have had on the financial system, which
prompted the Fed to consider creating a rescue package).
2010]
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why the Fed felt action was necessary to "prevent, correct, or
mitigate serious harm to the economy or the stability of the
financial system. ' 6° This section provides a basic overview of the
financial crisis and the circumstances that led to the collapse of
major financial institutions like AIG.
Two related factors are often blamed for causing the
financial meltdown: (1) the "deregulatory measures, taken both by
Congress and the SEC, which placed some categories of
derivatives and some firms beyond effective regulation[;]" and (2)
the related subprime mortgage collapse. 61
Financial derivatives, such as mortgage backed securities
and credit default swaps,62 allowed lenders to pass off risk to third
parties. 63  This was particularly prevalent in the sub-prime
mortgage market where most mortgages were securitized,6 leading
to speculation.65 Moreover, the complexity of these and related
instruments meant it was often difficult to evaluate the level of risk
presented, leading to inaccurate risk assessments by rating
agencies and, in turn, overvaluation by the market that relied on
those "misapplied" ratings.66 Thus, lenders could transfer their
worst loans to third parties through the process of securitization
and no longer carry the full risk of default. 67 When the mortgage
market began to decline, the initial defaults led to a chain of events
that caused even more defaults, a result of further declining
60. 12 U.S.C. § 248(r)(2)(A)(ii)(II).
61. See Coffee & Sale, supra note 58, at 731.
62. A credit default swap is a derivatives contract where a third party insures
against the occurrence of a "credit event," usually in the form of a default. The
contract functions through periodic payments by one party to the insuring party. If a
"credit event" occurs, the insuring party will "settle" by paying the outstanding value
of unfulfilled contract. See Patrick D. Fleming, Credit Derivatives Can Create a
Financial Incentive For Creditors to Destroy a Chapter 11 Debtor: Section 1126(e) and
Section 105(a) Provide a Solution, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 189,193-94 (2009).
63. Jongho Kim, From Vanilla Swaps to Exotic Credit Derivatives: How to
Approach the Interpretation of Credit Events, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 705,
743-44 (2008).
64. Engel & McCoy, supra note 58, at 2040.
65. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Disparate Regulatory Schemes for Parallel Activities:
Securities Regulation, Derivatives Regulation, Gambling, and Insurance, 24 ANN. REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 375, 436 (2005) (discussing the possibility of speculation in the
derivatives markets more generally).
66. See generally Mason & Rosner, supra note 58 (describing the complexity of
evaluating risk levels presented by derivate instruments).
67. Engel & McCoy, supra note 58, at 2049.
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property values, which in turn, rippled through the entire financial
sector.68
B. AIG "s Involvement
AIG was largely implicated in the financial crisis because of
61
its heavy involvement in the issuance of credit default swaps,
which can function as insurance against mortgage defaults.7" This
course of action was relatively unusual, at least in the sense that
most other insurance companies were not dealing with these
instruments.7 But because AIG was the world's largest insurer,72 it
was involved in more complex financial instruments than most
small insurance companies. As a result of the company's
significant involvement in credit default swaps, however, AIG had
lost nearly $18 billion in the three quarters leading up to
September 2008; losses for which it was able to raise money in
order to cover.73 Credit default swaps were only one part of AIG's
business and it was still operating profitable sectors of the
company, including certain sectors of its insurance business.74 At
the time, AIG had nearly $1 trillion in assets and shareholder
equity of roughly $78 billion, so credit default swaps were not a
significant proportion of the company's overall business."
68. Mason & Rosner, supra note 53, at 77.
69. See Andrew M. Kulpa, Minimal Deterrence: The Market Impact, Legal
Fallout, and Impending Regulation of Credit Default Swaps, 5 J. L. ECON. & POL'Y
291, 299 (2009). Credit default swaps functioned by transferring the buyers' credit
risk to third parties whom would assume the risk in the form of securities in exchange
for a premium. See Kim, supra note 63, at 729.
70. See Mathew Karnitschnig et al., U.S. to Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout;
Central Banks Inject Cash as Credit Dries Up, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2008, at Al,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122156561931242905.html.
71. Id.
72. Lilla Zuil, AIG's Title as World's Largest Insurer Gone Forever, REUTERS,
Apr. 29, 2009, http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2009/04/29/100066.htm
(stating that AIG was the world's largest insurer).
73. See Karnitschnig et al., supra note 70.
74. Id.
75. See Matthew Karnitschnig, Liam Pleven, & Peter Lattman, AIG Scrambles to
Raise Cash, Talks to Fed---Insurer Looks to Sell Automotive Business, Annuities Unit;
It Seeks $10 Billion in Fresh Capital as Downgrade Threatens, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15,
2008, at Cl.
2010] 343
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On September 15, 2008, partly in response to these losses,
AIG's credit ratings were downgraded.76 To bolster its rating, AIG
had to post an additional $14 billion dollars in collateral for its
credit default swaps.77 Additionally, AIG would have been
required to post collateral to investment banks and other
institutions with which it had a trading relationship. 78 Though AIG
was able to raise the funds to cover losses from the previous three
quarters, this time the company could not find the additional funds
it needed.7 9 AIG had far more than $14 billion in assets; however,
it did not have enough liquidity in order to raise the money in
time.8° AIG and the Fed tried to arrange a private loan from third
parties in the financial sector but were unsuccessful.8 ' As a result,
the Fed had to intervene in order to avoid AIG's imminent
bankruptcy.82
C. Fed Action
To save AIG, the Fed relied on its emergency powers in
83order to extend a loan to the struggling insurance giant. Pursuant
to those powers, the Fed authorized the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York to create an $85 billion dollar credit line for AIG.Y
This loan was collateralized by assets of AIG and its subsidiaries. 5
The federal government also "received a 79.9 [percent] equity
interest in AIG" and the right to veto dividend payments to
76. See Mary Williams Walsh & Michael J. de la Merced, A Race for Cash at
A.LG., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2008, at C1, available at 2008 WLNR 17575045.
77. Yomarie Silva, Recent Development, The "Too Big to Fail" Doctrine and the
Credit Crisis, 28 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 115, 125 (2009); Karnitschnig et al., supra
note 70.
78. Karnitschnig et al., supra note 70.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. David S. Hilzenrath & Glenn Kessler, U.S. Seizes Control of A.LG. With $85
Billion Emergency Loan, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 2008, http://www.washington
post.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/09/16/AR2008091602174.html?sid=ST20080916
00045.
82. See Karnitschnig et al., supra note 70.
83. See Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Sept. 16, 2008),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/20080916a.htm. §13(3) refers
to the emergency powers clause.
84. Id.
85. Silva, supra note 77, at 124-25.
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shareholders. 86 Shortly thereafter, AIG CEO Bob Willumstad was
asked to leave the company by Secretary of the Treasury Henry
Paulson, and he was replaced by Edward Liddy.87
Less than a month later, the Fed was forced to invoke its
emergency powers again, this time extending a $37.8 billion dollar
loan to AIG.8 This loan was collateralized using fixed income
securities that were previously lent to other investors but had since
been returned.89
D. Why the Fed Took Action
While the Fed was relatively oblique with regard to why it
chose to exercise its emergency powers to save AIG, it later
provided some hints as to why it thought action was necessary.90
First, the Fed would have been statutorily required to take the
position that the circumstances were "unusual and exigent. ' The
Fed had already invoked its emergency powers to save Bear
Stearns earlier that year.92 The AIG events also came on the heels
of the Lehman Brothers collapse just two days earlier.93 Chairmen
Bernanke indicated that both of those events led the Fed to
believe "unusual and exigent circumstances" existed and that
AIG's collapse threatened financial market stability.94 Second, the
Fed had shown that AIG was unable to secure funds from other,
86. Id. at 125; see also Charles Gasparino et al., AIG to Get $85 Billion Loan,
Gives Up 79.9% Stake, CNBC.coM, Sept. 17, 2008, http://www.cnbc.comlid/267
47020/print/l/displaymode/1098/ (describing the details of the plan).
87. See Karnitschnig et al., supra note 70.
88. See Tami Luhby, AIG Hits Up Fed for More Money, CNNMONEY.COM, Oct.
8, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/10/08/news/companies/aig/index.htm.
89. See id.
90. See Testimony on AIG before the H. Comm. of Fin. Serv., 111th Cong. (2009)
(statement of Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20090324
a.htm [hereinafter Bernanke Testimony].
91. See 12 U.S.C. § 343.
92. See Edmund L. Andrews et al., Fed in an $85 Billion Rescue of an Insurer
Near Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2008, at Al, available at 2008 WLNR 17634395.
93. See Carrick Mollencamp et al., Lehman Files for Bankruptcy, Merrill Sold,
AIG Seeks Cash, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1221454
92097035549.html.
94. See Bernanke Testimony, supra note 90 (using the language "extraordinary"
rather than unusual and exigent).
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private institutions.9' All that remained was a finding that action
was "necessary to prevent, correct, or mitigate serious harm to the
economy or the stability of the financial system of the United
States." 96 That finding would be reasonable since the Lehman
Brothers collapse led to a financial panic that nearly froze the
financial markets97 and actually resulted in some money-market
funds "breaking the buck.
98
Chairman Bernanke, in consultation with Treasury
Secretary Henry Paulson and President of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, Timothy Geithner, came to the conclusion
that Fed action was necessary to prevent AIG's bankruptcy, which
could have "disastrous repercussions" in the financial sector.9
This view is justifiable for a number of reasons. First, the Fed was
worried that effects of AIG's collapse would be realized by those
who had not been involved in speculative derivatives trading, such
as investors involved in money-market funds.1°° AIG was heavily
involved in money-markets, both by insuring money-market
instruments and by selling investment securities in the money-
markets, and the Fed feared that a collapse would have "spillover"
effects.1 1 This was especially worrisome to the Fed because
money-market instruments had traditionally been considered
extremely safe even though they were not FDIC insured.0 2 In fact,
the Treasury announced shortly thereafter that investments in
money-market funds before September 19, 2008, would be
insured.0 3 Secondly, there was some concern about how an AIG
95. Karnitschnig et al., supra note 70.
96. See 12 U.S.C. § 248(r)(2)(a)(ii)(II); supra pp. 340-45.
97. See David Wessel, Lehman's Legacy: Government's Trial and Error Helped
Stem Financial Panic, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2009, at Al.
98. Bernanke Testimony, supra note 90; see also Diana B. Henriques, The Buck
Broke. So How to Retool Money Funds?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2009, at BU13,
available at 2009 WLNR 20052901.
99. Karnitschnig et al., supra note 70.
100. See id. (discussing concerns over spillover effects into seemingly safe
investments held by small investors).
101. Id.; see also Andrews et al., supra note 92 (discussing the possibility of
spillover effects).
102. See Diana B. Henriques, Money Market Funds Are a Refuge, Right?, N.Y.
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bankruptcy would affect insurance policy holders.'0 Nonetheless,
this fear was likely overblown, as AIG CEO Edward Liddy
assured the public that "[AIG's] insurance businesses...[were]
strong and well capitalized."'0'5 In fact, based on AIG's subsidiary
business structure, it was unlikely that any private insurance
policies would have been affected. 1°6 Thirdly, Chairman Bernanke
subsequently indicated that the Fed considered the exposure of
other large financial institutions to AIG products, such as
commercial paper, and worried about a further contraction of the
financial markets that might follow if AIG failed.'07 Finally, state
and local governments had lent billions of dollars to AIG, much of
which might have been lost if AIG had filed for bankruptcy."'9
The view that AIG's collapse likely would have caused
major economic harm is justifiable because of the "spillover"
effects into various market sectors and because its collapse could
have induced financial panic." 9 Thus, it is reasonable to assume
that the Fed determined that AIG's failure would cause significant
problems in the financial markets and bailing out AIG would
prevent that harm. Presumptively, the Fed's decision to exercise
its emergency powers in favor of AIG was based upon its finding
that all the statutory elements were met."0
V. POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF FED ACTION
A. Too Big to Fail
The Fed's decision to rescue AIG, as well as other major
financial firms, supports the "too big to fail doctrine.... This
action was the result of the Fed's concern over the lasting, and
possibly permanent, damage that could be caused by the collapse
104. Andrews et al., supra note 92.
105. Luhby, supra note 88.
106. See Karnitschnig et al., supra note 70; Andrews et al., supra note 92.
107. Bernanke Testimony, supra note 85.
108. Id.
109. Wessel, supra note 92.
110. See id.
111. See Bill Saporito, How AIG Became Too Big to Fail, TIME, Mar. 19, 2009,
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1886275,00.htm; Silva, supra note
77.
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of a major, systemically significant firm like AIG through
"spillover" effects.' The premise behind the doctrine is that a
firm can grow to be "so large or so complex" that government
intervention becomes necessary in order to avert economic
disaster when the firm begins to falter"3 or that the government
cannot afford to let the institution crumble due to the effects its
failure will have on the market as a whole."
4
In advance of a collapse, however, there is currently no
clear criteria to determine which institutions' failure would result
in such a systemic risk."' Whether an institution is actually "too
big to fail" would be impossible to ascertain until it collapses and
the effects have been realized."6
In the absence of a set standard for what constitutes a
company that is too big to fail,"' many interpretations exist as to
which companies will be saved and which ones will be allowed to
fail. This lack of clarity may explain why the decision to allow
Lehman Brothers to fail has been so heavily criticized."
8
Arguably, Lehman Brothers was in a similar situation to AIG, but
it did not receive emergency aid from the federal government and
was forced to file for bankruptcy."9 Since that time however, it
seems that the federal government has declared that multiple firms
in many different industries are "too big to fail," including General
Motors, Chrysler, Citigroup, and Bank of America.' °
112. Karnitschnig et al., supra note 70; see supra pp. 345-47; infra pp. 348-50.
113. See Saporito, supra note 111; Silva, supra note 77.
114. Peter J. Wallison, Op-Ed., Not Everything Can Be Too Big to Fail, WALL ST.




117. Silva, supra note 77.
118. John Cassidy, Anatomy of a Meltdown: Ben Bernanke and the Financial
Crisis, NEW YORKER, Dec. 1, 2008, available at http://www.newyorker.com/
reporting/2008/12/01/081201fa fact_cassidy; see also Joe Nocera, Lehman Had to Die
So Global Finance Could Live, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2009, at Al, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/12/business/12nocera.html (detailing the criticisms
of the failure to rescue Lehman, before ultimately concluding it was a beneficial
decision).
119. See Susanne Craig, Deborah Solomon, Carrick Mollenkamp, & Matthew
Karnitschnig, LehmanRaces Clock; Crisis Spreads, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2008,
available at http://www.gata.org/node/6591; Silva, supra note 77.
120. Edmund L. Andrews & David E. Sanger, U.S. Is Finding Its Role in Business
Hard to Unwind, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.ny
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B. Expectations of Financial Actors
A second consequence of actions taken by the Fed, and
related to the "too big to fail doctrine," is the alteration of future
expectations by financial actors. Because the government has no
set standards as to how it decides when a company is "too big to
fail, '12' expectations, or a lack of clear expectations, may
contribute to market instability and moral hazard by incentivizing
financial institutions to take excessive risk with the expectation
that they will be saved by the government.1
The power of expectations could be seen as Congress
sought to pass the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP); the
stock market swayed up and down with every development, as
investors gambled on whether financial actors would be rescued.'
13
The power of expectations could also be seen as a financial panic
erupted following the Lehman Brothers collapse. 24 While not
bailing out Lehman Brothers may provide a lesson to those
companies who are thinking about taking excessive risk,125 it may
not have been worth the financial panic that ensued following its
collapse.2 6 There is also no definite way to determine whether
these companies will look to the Lehman Brothers model or the
AIG model when gauging future behavior. It is possible that
major financial institutions will look at federal action in particular,
and decide that taking high levels of risk is the rational choice
because they will be rescued by the Fed if the risk does not pay off,
times.com12009/09/14fbusiness/14big.html [hereinafter Andrews & Sanger]; see also
Silva, supra note 77 (discussing the too big to fail problem).
121. See Silva, supra note 77.
122. See Robert Robb, Op-Ed., The Lehman Debacle and Lessons Learned, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, Sept. 18, 2009, at B5, 2009 WLNR 18491482; see also Lawrence A.
Cunningham, Too Big to Fail: Moral Hazard in Auditing and the Need to Restructure
the Industry Before it Unravels, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1698, 1698 (2006) (introducing
the idea of moral hazard relating to the "too big to fail" doctrine in the accounting
industry).
123. See Robb, supra note 122; Jim Zarroli & Steve Inskeep, U.S. Markets Wait
AnxiouslyFor Rescue Plan, NPR, Oct. 1, 2008 available at http://www.npr.org/tem
plates/story/story.php?storyld=95236423&ps=rs.
124. Wessel, supra note 97.
125. Cf. Robb, supra note 122 (citing Lehman's bankruptcy proceedings because
they were not rescued).
126. See id.
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thus embodying the phenomenon known as moral hazard. 2 1
President Obama has since tried to undo the damage caused by
these expectations, telling financial institutions not to return to
reckless behavior and warning them that taxpayers will not be
there to save them next time.28 But can rhetoric alone really be
effective? Furthermore, how likely is it that we can afford to take
a hard-line and allow companies to fail in the future? Is it more
likely that the government will make the same decisions again if
potential collapse poses a high degree of systemic risk? 2 9
VI. THE SYSTEMIC RISK REFORM AGENDA
This Part will discuss the positive and negative aspects of
the Fed wielding the incredible power of emergency intervention
and will summarize and supplement current proposals on how to
achieve a better balance between independence, transparency, and
accountability without resorting to the current ad hoc system that
leads to inherent uncertainty.
The Fed was designed as an independent central bank,
isolated from outside political pressure.3 Accordingly, the Fed
implements its emergency powers with a relatively low level of
external restriction or control, even though these actions have far-
reaching effects.3  With independence and high levels of
discretion come various strengths and weaknesses that should be
considered when making policy decisions.
127. Editorial, Few Changes Follow Year of Recovery, N.Z. HERALD, Sept. 19,
2009, at A018, 2009 WLNR 18383060 [hereinafter Few Changes]; see also
Cunningham, supra note 122, at 1698 (discussing moral hazard).
128. Few Changes, supra note 127.
129. See Wallison, supra note 114.
130. See Michael Wade Strong, Rethinking the Federal Reserve System: A
Monetarist Plan for a More Constitutional System of Central Banking, 34 IND. L. REV.
371,371 (2001).
131. See generally David Small & James Clouse, The Limits the Federal Reserve
Act Places on the Monetary Policy Actions of the Federal Reserve, 19 ANN. REV.
BANKING L. 553 (2000) (discussing the broad powers of the Fed).
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A. Who Should Decide Too Big to Fail?
The question of who should decide which companies are
"too big to fail" presents conflicting goals of independence,
transparency, accountability, and efficiency. In the present crisis,
multiple agencies including the Treasury Department, the Fed,
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), have all
played a role in rescuing various institutions.32 Policy makers must
determine whether it is best to have an existing agency be the
exclusive entity to make this determination, whether to create a
new agency for this purpose, or whether to continue with the ad
hoc system currently in place.
Recently, there has been criticism of the Fed's negotiations
with AIG over the bailout, alleging weakness and
ineffectiveness.' Concurrently, proposals have emerged that
recommend stripping powers from the Fed.3  These proposals
range from a requirement that the Fed get Treasury approval for
the exercise of its emergency powers35 to only allowing the Fed to
authorize lending to healthy firms through broad-based lending
program using its emergency powers.136 The second proposal
would only allow the FDIC to lend to individual firms with the
purpose of facilitating an orderly dissolution of the company, not
performing a rescue.'37 The FDIC process for identifying systemic
risk and solutions already involves a system of approval by the
Treasury Department and the Fed. 38 The second solution would
132. Andrews & Sanger, supra note 120.
133. See Mary Williams Walsh, Audit Faults New York Fed in A.IG. Bailout, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 17 2009 at B1, available at 2009 WLNR 23127399 [hereinafter Audit
Faults].
134. See Discussion Draft, Davis Polk, Summary of The Restoring American
Financial Stability Act of 2009, Introduced by Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT)
November 10, 2009 (Nov. 13, 2009), at 8, available at http://www.davispolk.com/
files[Publication/64ce87e4-9e7a-4d10-ba6c27a55ad72f09/Presentation/Publication
Attachment/31830e60-c328-4f73-887d27c5bd2d5d6b/111309_doddjlegislative_
summary.pdf [hereinafter Davis Polk]; see also DEP'T. OF THE TREAS., FINANCIAL
REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION 8 (2009), available at http://www.fin
ancialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport-web.pdf [hereinafter FINANCIAL
REGULATORY REFORM].
135. See FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, supra note 134, at 8.
136. See Davis Polk, supra note 134, at 12.
137. See id.
138. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G) (2006).
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essentially eliminate the too big to fail problem because individual,
struggling companies would not survive.139 Proposals that require
the creation of new agencies or councils would likely have the
same result, though it may provide for more coordination across
regulators. 4° These proposals show some promise of increasing
transparency and accountability by putting the exercise of the most
contentious decision in the hands of more politically accountable
agencies, while retaining the Fed's role as the conductor of
monetary policy.
B. Transparency
The recent financial crisis has stirred criticism over the
transparency of Fed action. 141 In fact, the Fed has been able to
make over $2 trillion in emergency loans without revealing the
142names of the institutions receiving the money. The Fed argues
that this lack of transparency is necessary in order to protect banks
from any stigma that may attach due to borrowing from the
discount window, and thus, further weaken the financial markets.
143
The idea that transparency will discourage banks from borrowing
at the discount window is a valid concern,'" but there is no reason
that the details of these loans should not at least be disclosed to
139. See Davis Polk, supra note 134, at 4 (also proposing direct regulation on
systemically important institutions before they are subject to collapse through
increased capital, leverage, and liquidity requirements based on size and
interconnectedness). A similar solution has been passed in the House of
Representatives, modifying the power of the Fed and requiring a dissolution fund for
failed systemically significant institutions to be determined by the President. See
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong.
(2009).
140. See FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, supra note 134, at 8.
141. See Steve Matthews & Craig Torres, Bernanke Says Federal Reserve Won't




144. Dan Wilchins, Top International Banks Tap Fed Discount Window, REUTERS,
Aug. 22, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/articlebusinessNews/idUSN2243173420070823
(discussing the stigma traditionally attached with borrowing from the discount
window).
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Congress, to which the Fed is accountable .' Limited disclosure
would allow some monitoring of Fed action without exposing the
names of borrowers directly to the public. Conversely, this may
allow the development of a public political battle if Congress is
146particularly unhappy with a decision.
As a result of the growing concern with the Fed's lack of
transparency, Congress has taken multiple steps to find a suitable
solution. 47  First, the Senate passed a non-binding resolution
demanding the Fed to reveal the names of the institutions to which
it is lending."'4 Second, and perhaps more significantly,
Congressman Ron Paul proposed the Federal Reserve
Transparency Act of 2009.149 This legislation would amend 31
U.S.C. § 714 to allow and mandate an audit of the Fed and would
make the results available to Congress.5 More recent proposals
have also suggested requiring GAO audits of any use of
emergency powers, publication of any use of Fed emergency
powers, and periodic reports to Congress.'
These measures in Congress have had some persuasive
112effect on Fed actions. Recently, the Fed has been much more
forthcoming about the details of its lending program.53 The Fed is
still hesitant to release the names of ordinary borrowers and may,
at any time, cease its policy of voluntary disclosure of the names of
145. See Sudeep Reddy, Fed Weighs Naming Borrowers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26,
2009, at A2, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125389264645141251.html
(discussing the Congressional demand for more disclosure).
146. See, e.g., History of Central Banking, supra note 14, at 6 (citing previous
power struggles between the Fed and the other branches of government).
147. RANDALL D. GUYNN, ANNETrE L. NAZARETH & MARGARET E. TAHYAR,
DAVIS POLK FINANCIAL CRISIS MANUAL: CHAPTER 1: FEDERAL RESERVE
EMERGENCY INTERVENTION AUTHORITY: OLD TOOLS USED IN NEW WAYS 36-37
(Davis, Polk, & Wardwell Sept. 2009).
148. Id.
149. Federal Reserve Transparency Act, H.R. 1207, 111th Cong. (2009).
Language from this proposed bill was adopted in a more comprehensive financial
reform bill passed by the House. See Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection
Act, 111 H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2009).
150. Federal Reserve Transparency Act, 111 H.R. 1207, 111th Cong. (2009).
151. See Davis Polk, supra note 134, at 51.
152. See Guynn, Nazareth, & Tahyar, supra note 147, at 37.
153. Id. at 37; see also Federal Reserve Transparency Before the H. Com. on Fin.
Serv., 111th Cong. (2009) (testimony of Scott G. Alvarez, Gen. Counsel, Federal
Reserve Board), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/alvarez2009
0925a.htm [hereinafter Alvarez Testimony].
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large financial institutions borrowing as a result of the exercise of
154its emergency powers.
Despite increased voluntary transparency, the Fed
adamantly opposes passage of the Federal Reserve Transparency
Act,"' stressing the fact that it is already subject to an annual
audit, testimony before Congress, and voluntarily publishes details
156of its decisions regarding open market operations. The Fed
argues that subjecting monetary policy to GAO audit, or the threat
of an audit, would allow Congress to influence monetary policy
and could even lead to less productive discussions of what action
should be taken. It argues further that subjecting discount
window operations to audit would decrease its effectiveness by
increasing the stigma associated with borrowing and decreasing
investor confidence.
Lack of transparency at the Fed raises many questions.
There are concerns over the legitimacy of decisions made by the
Fed when those decisions cannot be checked by the body to which
it is accountable, especially when those decisions are
extraordinary. Arguably, the funds from TARP, administered by
the Treasury Department, perform a similar task, but the Treasury
Department has vowed to meet demands for transparency through
disclosure and procedural safeguards.159  If the Treasury
Department can perform the same job as the Fed and is
transparent and more directly accountable, why should the Fed be
involved? What is certain, is that without some transparency, at
least to Congress or certain congressional committees, there is no
154. Guynn, Nazareth, & Tahyar, supra note 147, at 37; see also Alvarez
Testimony, supra note 153 (discussing the Fed's disclosure policy).




159. Matthews & Torres, supra note 141; see also Letter from Timothy F.
Geithner, Sec'y. of Treas., Dep't. of Treas., to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House,
U.S. House of Representatives (Apr. 15, 2009), available at http://www.financial
stability.gov/docs/TransparencyLettersl.pdf [hereinafter Geithner Letter].
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way to hold the Fed accountable for mistakes it has made or to
prevent mistakes that it may be making.160
Policymakers must also ask whether transparency is
desirable and in what situations. At least some have argued that
increased transparency may, in some circumstances, lead to more
efficient markets.1 6' Nonetheless, policymakers must also be aware
of the stigma associated with full transparency and the resulting
economic harm that may result. 62 As the Fed argues, it has taken
important steps to increase its transparency during the recent
financial crisis.1 63 Nonetheless, it has refused to be transparent
with regard to most discount window operations because it
believes it will reduce effectiveness.'6" Policymakers in Congress
must find the proper balance between transparency and
independence to maximize legitimacy, clarify expectations, and
simultaneously retain the independence necessary to operate
successful monetary policy.
C. Accountability
Another major concern with the Fed's broad emergency
powers is its lack of political accountability. 65 Congress intended
to design an independent agency that would be isolated from
political influence in making decisions for the best interest of the
nation's economy.' 66 Recently, however, there is growing concern
in Congress and in the public that voters have no means to hold
the Fed responsible for its actions despite the broad influence it
exercises over the economy. 16 Currently, the method for ensuring
160. Editorial Copy, Focus on the Fed, WASH. POST, at A20, July 24, 2009,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/23/AR
2009072303004.html [hereinafter Focus on the Fed].
161. See Eric T. Swanson, Federal Reserve Transparency and Financial Market
Forecasts of Short-Term Interest Rates, Bd. of Gov. of the Fed. Reserve, at 4, (2004),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2004/200406/200406pap.pdf (stating that Fed
transparency has had some positive impact on predictions of short-term interest
rates).
162. Matthews & Torres, supra note 141.
163. Alvarez Testimony, supra note 153.
164. Id.
165. See Strong, supra note 130, at 387-88.
166. Id.
167. Guynn, Nazareth, & Tahyar, supra note 147, at 38.
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accountability is to require the Fed to report to Congress and
congressional committees at various stages throughout the year.68
Presently, Congress has three options as pressure mounts to make
the Fed more accountable. Congress can completely eliminate the
Fed, maintain the current status of the Fed, or find an intermediate
position.
Some scholars have gone so far as to argue that the idea of
the Fed as an independent organization is unconstitutional. 69
They argue that the power to conduct monetary policy, including
the emergency powers, should be given to Congress, creating more
accountability to the general public.170  Furthermore, this plan
would require Congress to assign monetary policy to a committee
and would then allow ratification of Congressional action by the
President. 17' Nonetheless, the Fed has become a major player in
the United States and it is doubtful that its role would be simply
handed over to Congress and the President. This plan would
also politicize monetary policy decision-making and could lead to
173negative economic consequences.
Other solutions exist that may increase the Fed's
accountability without vastly reshaping the central bank. These
solutions are especially relevant since most economists support the
idea of retaining a fairly independent actor to conduct monetary
policy. 174 One solution would be to transfer the emergency powers
to the Treasury Department or another entity. Proposals in
Congress take this approach, advocating a new agency or council
that would continuously supervise systemic risk determinations by
168. Federal Reserve System: Frequently Asked Questions, Federal Reserve
Board, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/faq/faqfrs.htm#8.
169. See generally Strong, supra note 130 (arguing that the Fed is
unconstitutional).
170. Id. at 388.
171. Id. at 390.
172. See Alvarez Testimony, supra note 153 (demonstrating the Fed's opposition
to attempts to assert Congressional control).
173. See generally Thomas Havrilesky, The Politicization of Monetary Policy: The
Vice Chairman As the Administrations Point Man, 13 CATO J. 137 (1993) (arguing
that inflation performance is more successful in countries that have an independent
central bank conducting monetary policy).
174. See Guynn, Nazareth, & Tahyar, supra note 147, at 37.
175. Id. at 38.
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the Fed.76  The emergency powers have little to do with
conducting everyday monetary policy and more to do with
stabilizing the market during times of crisis.'77 This solution would
leave the Fed to conduct everyday monetary policy isolated from
political interference, but would also allow the Treasury
Department, which is more accountable to the people through the
President, to make the most controversial decisions, such as
creating rescue packages to save AIG or allowing Lehman
Brothers to fail. A variant of this proposal would be to require the
Secretary of the Treasury to approve emergency action taken by
the Fed. 78 This solution would allow the Fed to retain all of its
discretionary power, but would only subject the more political,
emergency decisions to Treasury approval. Nonetheless, the
process could be politicized if a public power struggle were to
ensue between the two bodies.79
Because it is highly unlikely that the Fed will cease to exist
and because it is undesirable to allow monetary policy to become
politicized' 80 the most viable option is to design legislation to
increase accountability, especially with regard to discretionary,
controversial decisions like the exercise of emergency powers,
while retaining the relative independence of everyday monetary
policy. Either of the ideas proposed would accomplish this task
and would give large institutions pause before they take excessive
176. See FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, supra note 134, at 4, (proposing a
Financial Services Oversight Council composed of the heads of financial services
agencies and Treasury approval of emergency powers decisions); CHAIRMAN CHRIS
DODD S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 111TH CONG.,
RESTORING AMERICAN FINANCIAL STABILITY 3 (Comm. Print 2009) (2009), available
at http://banking.senate.gov/public/-fileslFinancialReformSummaryFCll189.pdf
(proposing the creation of a new Agency for Financial Stability composed of the
heads of financial services agencies).
177. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, How the Fed Reached Out to Lehman, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 2008, at B1, available at 2008 WLNR 24053612.
178. Guynn, Nazareth, & Tahyar, supra note 147, at 39; see also FINANCIAL
REGULATORY REFORM, supra note 134, at 4. A variant of this solution was
considered and passed by the House, requiring Treasury and Presidential approval.
See H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2009).
179. See, e.g., History of Central Banking, supra note 14 (citing previous power
struggles between the Fed and the other branches of government).
180. Guynn, Nazareth, & Tahyar, supra note 147, at 37.
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risk.18' They would know that any attempt to create a rescue
package would meet strong opposition from Congress, which may
result in an increased congressional assertion of power over the
process. 18 Congress must decide how accountable the Fed should
and will be to the public and to the three political branches.
D. Speed of Action
One positive aspect of the Fed's power to act in emergency
situations is speed and flexibility. The Fed acted almost
immediately to rescue AIG183 On the other hand, Congress took
more than two weeks to pass the TARP legislation, '84 so it may
prove unwise to rely on congressional action during each crisis. It
seems that Congress lacks the ability to make quick, expensive
decisions that the Fed has demonstrated its ability to make. This is
likely due to the independence of the Fed and its lack of
accountability to the public, a virtue in some circumstances. The
Fed's efficiency provides one reason not to completely delegate
monetary policy to Congress, the President or other agencies, but
instead, to create a new process or agency to manage systemic risk
in the future."' Nonetheless, it is also possible that Congress could
redesign the Fed to increase accountability and transparency while
maintaining the Fed's ability to act quickly. These are issues that
must be discussed going forward.
VII. CONCLUSION
The actions the Fed took during the recent financial crisis
to rescue firms like AIG have provoked much discussion. It is
181. Cf Brian Naylor, Senate Tries Its Hand at Passing Bailout Plan, NPR, Oct. 1,
2008, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=95236420&
ps=rs (demonstrating the strong opposition from both political parties in Congress in
passing a bailout plan).
182. See id.
183. See Karnitschnig et al., supra note 70.
184. The Fed. Res. Bank of St. Louis, The Financial Crisis: A Timeline of Events
and Policy Actions, http://timeline.stlouisfed.org/index.cfm?p=timeline (last visited
Jan. 21, 2010).
185. See contra, Strong, supra note 130, at 388 (arguing that we should turn over
monetary policy decisions to Congress and the President).
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important to continue this discussion as Congress analyzes the role
of the Fed in our national financial system. While the history of
the central bank has not always been smooth,8' the United States
has come a long way in designing an institution that is relatively
independent and isolated from direct political influence."" The
Fed has proven its ability to act quickly and decisively. 18
Nonetheless, it is also possible that the Fed will make mistakes,
especially when making highly politicized decisions about systemic
risk.89 It is important for congressional policymakers to design a
central bank that strikes the correct balance between enhancing
accountability and transparency, while maintaining the positive
aspects of an independent, nonpolitical institution.
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186. See generally Gordon, supra note 11 (discussing the history of U.S. central
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